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Abstract
This study analyses the  impact  of  contract  farming  on  cassava  production,  price  determination  and  farmer ’s income  in 
Ruhango district in Rwanda. It uses a participatory assessment method using an interactive tool commonly na med “it ta k es 
two to tango”. Data were collected from cassava farmers and a Cassava Processing Plant employees. The findings show tha t 
the  contract  farming  did not contribute  to  cassava production  improvement. The  contract  farming did not help  in the 
availability and accessibility of agricultural inputs such as planting material and fertilizer used in cassava farming. Findings of 
the  study also  show  that  the  contract  farming  did  not lead  to mutual cassava price determination. Regarding the income, 
farmers  indicated  that  the  contract  farming  did  not lead  to  the  increase in income. The Cassava Processing Plant should 
support the farmers in improving cassava production through the training on land preparation, management of  the pla nting 
material, fertilizing, cropping, weeding and harvesting. The price of fresh cassava should be fully determined together  by the 
farmers and the Cassava Processing Plant. Improvement in cassava production and mutual price determina tion should help
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Smallholdings constitute a majority of primary 
agricultural production units in developing countries 
and contribute to national economies. Despite their 
important role in food production, smallholders face 
a number of challenges including unreliable and costly 
inputs (Smalley, 2013; Ton, 2018). They also tend to 
lack credit facilities and markets for their produce 
since local markets can be changeable (Gumataw et 
al., 2013; Otsuka, et al, 2016). One of the ways to 
overcome these setbacks and access stable market 
opportunities for smallholder farmers is to go into 
contract farming which guarantees the market for 
their agricultural produce and other advantages such 
as increased bargaining power and easy access to 
agricultural inputs like seeds, feed or fertilizers 
(Mwambi et al., 2016; Otsuka, et al, 2016; Ton, 
2018)). 
 
Contract farming is an agreement between farmers 
and a contractor for the production and supply of 
products under forward agreements, frequently at 
predetermined prices (FAO, 2017). This method 
benefits farmers through increased productivity and 
income, while simultaneously reducing the cost and 
risks associated with production (Otsuka, et al, 2016; 
FAO, 2017). Contract farming can reduce poverty in 
farming communities (Fayet and Vermeulen, 2014; 
Mwambi et al., 2016). Particularly, in developing 
countries the advantages of contract farming include  
the promotion of the access to higher income, 
shifting from low-nutritious foods to high-nutritious 
foods, liberalised markets, improved transport and 
logistics accessibility, and using modern technology in 
agriculture (Reardon and Timmer, 2014; Otsuka, et al. 
2016; FAO, 2017). However, contract farming has 
experienced weaknesses. Farmers participating in 
contract farming may be exposed to insecure 
monopolistic farming system for selling their crops, 
limited bargaining possibility, delayed and reduced 
payments, possibility of rejecting their products, 
forced use of unfamiliar technologies, and the 
possibility of finding themselves excluded from the 
arrangements (Otsuka, et al, 2016; FAO, 2017). 
 
The contract farming may be written or verbal 
(Prowse, 2012). The written contract is most known 
and has a legal advantage which facilitates its 
enforcement and resolution of conflicts that can arise 
during its implementation. The verbal contract is also 
useful and has contributed much in agribusiness 
although its binding powers are associated with a grey 
area of enforcement (FAO, 2017). In both cases, the 
agreement specifies the conditions of provision of 
resources, terms of production, marketing conditions, 
use of land and legal title to the crop. The 
smallholdings is normally defined as a land  not 
exceeding 20hectares (Eastwood et al., 2010). In 
Rwanda, where the average land size is 0.4 hectares 
per household and agriculture contributes around 
80% to the national economy (NISR, 2014), 
smallholdings are defined as farm having below 0.5 
hectares and constitute about 57% of total farms 
(MINECOFIN, 2007). Consequently, to boost food 
production, increase the farmer’s income and 
improve nutrition within such farming system 
characterised by the scarcity of farming land require 
the best agricultural policies, programs and strategies. 
The Crop Intensification Program (CIP) was hence 
setup for facilitating the inputs use (improved seeds 
and fertilizer), land use consolidation, provision of 
extension services and improvement of post-harvest 
handling and storage mechanisms (MINAGRI, 2012). 
The CIP program focuses on maize, wheat, rice, Irish 
potato, beans and cassava crops (MINAGRI, 2012).  
 
Like other crops, cassava is mainly grown in 
smallholdings counting for 10% of arable land 
(MINAGRI, 2012). Due to Cassava Mosaic Virus 
(CMV) and Cassava Brown Disease pests which 
drastically reduced the cassava production between 
2004 and 2007 (Night et al. 2011), new varieties more 
resistant to CMD and with yield three times the yield 
of old varieties have been introduced to farmers 
(USAID Rwanda, 2010). The yield for new varieties 
can reach 30 to 40 tons per ha without fertilizer 
application (USAID Rwanda, 2010). The measures 
taken resulted in notable increase of 45.2 % of 
cassava production between 2007 and 2010 (World 
Bank, 2014).  The increase in yield led to the 
establishment of a Cassava Processing Plant with the 
capacity of processing 144 tons of fresh cassava into 
48 tons of cassava flour per day in Ruhango district 
(Ruhango district, 2013). The Cassava Processing 
Plant entered into verbal contract farming approach 
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with farmers for improving cassava production, 
relying on a sustainable source of raw cassava 
produce and help farmers to raise the income. 
However, it is working under its full capacity because 
of low supply of fresh cassava leading to the 
production of 15 tons of cassava flour per day. This 
article aimed at analysing the impacts of contract 
farming on cassava production, price determination 
and farmer’s income in Ruhango district in Rwanda.  
 
Materials and Methods  
 
This study was conducted in Ruhango district in Southern 
province of Rwanda in 2017. Ruhango district covers an 
area of 626.8 km2 and has a population of about 319 ,885 
making a density of 510 inhabitants per square km 
(Ruhango district, 2013). The essential economic activities 
include agriculture where cassava is one of the major 
crops, industry and commerce, tourism and handcraft. 
Cassava covers around 13,271ha of arable land in the 
district and its yield is around 35 tones per ha (Ruhango 
district, 2013). A participatory assessment using the tool 
“It takes two to tango” (Schrader et al., 2012) was 
conducted to analyse the impact of contract farming on 
cassava production, price determination and farmer’s 
income. Forty seven (47) respondents comprising 38 
farmers supplying cassava to the Cassava Processing Plant 
and 9 employees of  the Plant were requested for  scoring 
the statements describing the role of contract farming on a 
4 points Likert scale i.e. “0= Strongly disagree”, 
“1=Disagree”, “2=Agree”, “3=Strongly agree”. An even 
number of possibilities was given to respondents for 
making sure that they clearly indicate their positive or 
negative position on the statement. Independent sample t-
test for unequal variances at 95% confidence level was 
calculated to determine the agreement and disagreement 
on each statement between farmers and employees. A cut-
off point between disagreement and agreement levels was 
fixed at 2. An average score below 2 shows poor 
agreement, hence poor impact of contract farming while 
the average score above 2 shows a positive agreement 






Contract farming and cassava production
The data analysis results in table 1 show that the difference 
in  overall  mean  scores  by  both  farmers  and  factory 
employees  is  less  the average score and is not statistically 
different  (p  =  0.350). The findings imply that there is no 
impact of contract farming on cassava production. T her e 
is  no  impact  of  contract  farming  on  fertiliser  use, 
determination  of the  cost  of  production,  availability  of
affordable inputs to farmers. For farmers, contract farming 
has no impact on availability of sufficient and good 
planting material and did not help in their training in 
cassava cultivation by the Cassava Processing Plant. The 
findings contradict the views of Otsuka, et al.(2016) and 
FAO (2017) that the contract farming benefits farmers 
through increased productivity.
 
Table 1. Impact of contract of farming on cassava production 






Farmers Factory    
1 Sufficient planting materials available to farmers 1.58 2.00 -3.59 37.00 0.001 
2 Farmers use fertilizers 0.55 1.00 -1.33 4.85 0.240 




2.12 -6.08 20.23 0.001 
4 Cassava yield increases 2.00 2.00 0.00 36.00 1.000 
5 Farmers are aware of the production cost of 1kg of fresh 
cassava 
0.86 1.44 -2.15 12.04 0.052 
6 Limited farms size 1.23 1.50 -1.22 11.56 0.246 
7 Farms are suitable for cassava crop  2.68 2.33 1.91 11.60 0.081 
8 Availability of affordable inputs to farmers 1.88 1.66 -1.59 9.65 0.143 
9 Farmers obtain good planting materials 1.89 2.00 -0.42 10.05 0.682 








 Source: Data from survey of this study 
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The Cassava Processing Plant should support the farmers 
in improving cassava farming. The factory should focus on 
the promotion of fertiliser and good planting material use, 
land preparation, management of the planting materials, 
fertilizing, cropping, weeding, harvesting and post-harvest 
handling and determination of production cost. Trained 
farmers would be more able to improve cassava farming 
and raise cassava productivity and production. This could 
result in cassava production increase which would help the 
Cassava Processing Plant to receive enough raw fresh 
cassava and to operate at its full capacity.
 
Contract farming and cassava price determination 
The results in table 2 show that there is no difference in 
overall mean scores of respondents on cassava price 
determination (p= 0.013). The receipt of the same price 
and the existence of side buyers were scored above the 
average score by farmers. Insufficient knowledge on the 
production cost and price of cassava flour, limited 
participation in fresh cassava price setting, not respecting 
the payment schedule and lack of trust in factory weighing 
balance and satisfactory price were scored less the average 
score (2) by farmers. Consequently, the farmers could be 
more interested in searching for alternative buyers of their  
fresh cassava despite their agreement with the factory. This 
could be justified by their high knowledge on the existence 
of other buyers of fresh cassava (their score (2.89) is closer 
to maximum score (3)). Not respecting the payment 
schedule could imply that the farmers would search for a  
buyer paying on time given that most of the time farmers 
are in urgent need of cash because of limited sources of 
income. The factory employees scored below the average 
score the participation of farmers in price setting and less 
cassava consumed by farmers compared to cassava sold. 
The factory employees also indicated that there are side 
buyers of fresh cassava and the payment schedule is 
respected. Although, the contract farming allows the 
farmers to selling at good price determined through mutual 
agreement (Otsuka, et al, 2016), the findings show that 
farmers are not participating to cassava price 
determination.  
 
Table 2. Impact of contract farming on cassava price determination  
No Market and price setting Mean score 
(max.3) 
t-test df 95% 
p-value 
Farmer Factory 
1 I know the production cost of 1kg of cassava flour paid 
by the Cassava Processing Factory 
0.62 2.50 -8.98 10.40 0.001 
2 Farmers know the price the factory sells 1kg of cassava 
flour 
1.52 2.66 -5.31 19.98  0.001 
3 Cassava auto-consumed is greater than the fresh cassava 
sold 
0.71 0.66 0.17 9.75 0.864 
4 There are buyers of fresh cassava other than the Factory 2.89 2.77 0.75 9.96 0.469 
5 Farmers participate in price setting 0.08 1.88 -14.42 12.78 0.001 
6 Farmers are happy with the price offered by the Cassava 
Plant 
0.21 2.00 -9.36 13.54 0.001 
7 The Processing Factory pays farmers on time  1.29 2.22 -4.65 23.13 0.001 
8 All farmers receive the same price 2.16 2.66 -2.37 19.38 0.027 
9 Farmers have trust in the Cassava factory’s weighing 
balance 
1.10 2.77 -7.26 32.65 0.001 
Overall mean score 1.18 2.24 -2.79 15 0.013 
Source: Data from survey of this study 
 
The price of fresh cassava should be determined together  
by farmers and the Cassava Processing Plant. The mutual 
determination of the price is necessary for avoiding the 
thinking that one party is gaining more in the deal than the 
other. The Cassava Processing Plant should also share the 
information related to processing cost. This information 
would help the farmers to understand that the trade is fa ir  
and decide about their supply of fresh cassava. The 
information on the price of the cassava flour at the factory 
is also necessary for increased transparency between the 
farmers and the factory. The Cassava Processing Plant 
should take measures for raising the farmers trust in its 
business in general and particularly the trust in weighting 
balance, as some are not knowledgeable about the 
functioning of the balance. Trust between partners in 
business and clients and business owner is necessary for 
the success of the business.  
 
 









Contract farming and farmer income
The results in table 3 show that the overall mean score for 
farmers  was  1.4  times  less  than the Cassava  Processing 
Plant employees score and the difference was statistically 
significant. According to farmers, the contract farming did 
not  help  in  improving  their  income. The  income  is  not 
steady, the advice from the factory is poor, there is a poor 
help  in  getting  loans to invest in farming activities. These 
three  variables  are  so  critical  to  cassava  growing 
improvements  which  could  result  in  cassava  production 
increase and thus farmers’ income increase. These r esults
contradict the findings of (Reardon and Timmer, 2014; 
Otsuka, et al., 2016; FAO, 2017) who found that the 
contract farming promotes the access to higher incomes in 
developing countries. The permission to sell to the 
Cassava Processing Plant, investing the money from 
cassava selling and the guaranteed market were scored 
above the average score which explains their good impact 
on farmer’s income.  
 
 
Table 3. Impact of contract farming on farmer income 
 Farming agreements Mean score (max. 3) 
t-test df 
95% 
p-value Farmer Factory 
1.  Cultivating cassava provides a steady income 1.28 2.37 -4.83 15.14 0.001 
2.  The Cassava processing Plant advises farmers on cassava 
farming 
0.55 2.12 -6.22 10.66 0.001 
3.  Each farmer is allowed to sell fresh cassava to The Cassava 
Processing Plant 
2.52 2.88 -2.53 20.16 0.020 
4.  The money from cassava selling are used in cassava 
production and/or other activities generating income 
2.05 2.71 
-3.21 9.26 0.010 
5.  Cassava producers are helped to get loans for their farming 
activities 
1.43 2.25 -3.04 9.32 0.013 
6.  Farmers are happy with cassava market guaranteed by The 
Cassava Processing Plant 
2.84 2.77 0.40 10.81 0.693 
Overall mean score 1.78 2.52 -1.99 6 0.09 
 
The contract farming should help the farmers to have 
consistent income from selling their fresh cassava to the 
Cassava Processing Plant. This could help the Cassava 
Processing Plant to rely on sustainable fresh cassava supply 
and operate at its full capacity. Therefore, training farmers 
in cassava farming by the Cassava Processing Plant would 
lead to yield increase and thus the income increase from 
selling the increased fresh cassava produce. Training and 
advising farmers could also help the Cassava Processing 
Plant to give recommendations to farmers in line of 
meeting the demand either in quality and/or in quantity. 
Furthermore, the Cassava Processing Plant should a lways 
be able to accept the supply from the farmers it is 
contracting with. If it happens for the Cassava Processing 
Plant to obtain larger quantities of cassava from farmers, it 
should rely on a third party for continued market 
guarantee of its suppliers and respect of the agreement. 
The Cassava Processing Plant should also help farmers to 
get loans given that loan access was reported by the 
farmers to be low. The help in getting loans could be done 
through advocacy, pointing out the importance of cassava 
farming in food security and income and the importance 




The objective of this study was to analyse the impact of 
contract farming on cassava production, price 
determination and farmer income in smallholdings in 
Ruhango district in Rwanda. The farmers were not advised 
on or supported in cassava farming. The contract farming 
did not lead to mutual cassava price setting. The price of 
the fresh cassava was not mutually determined by 
contracting parties. There has been no increase in cassava 
productivity and production and farmer’s income. Overall, 
contract farming did not impact positively cassava 
production, price determination and farmer’s income. 
Therefore, the Cassava Processing Plant should support 
the farmers in improving cassava cultivating by focusing 
on fertiliser and good planting material use. The price of 
fresh cassava should be fully determined together by the 
farmers and the Cassava Processing Plant. The verbal 
contract farming should be replaced with the written 
farming contract which is more binding. 
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